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ABSTRACT: Drawing on a study of floods in Lully,
Geneva, the authors describe the plural dimensions of
flood risk and extend the conventional understanding of
risk, often limited to mapping a hazard zone and
gradation of consequences. They analyse the dynamics
of risk beyond the immediate phenomenon, through
time and space. They draw on various kinds of
knowledge of risk, from those affected by the floods,
from locals with expert knowledge and from officialdom.
A detailed analysis tracks how events transform these
types of knowledge and how they evolve through time.
In a sense, the flooding in Lully can be seen as a
focusing event – an event that led to a shake-up of
knowledge and practice and became an agent in the
process of change. 
Introduction
One approach to risks (for researchers and those
involved in risk management) is to define them in
spatial terms. Drawing flooding zones, locating an area
of polluted soil, or identifying housing that no longer
meets minimum safety standards, are some common
ways of identifying areas at risk in order to deal with
them more effectively. Thus, the spatial dimension of
risk is often understood in a restricted sense, as a
‘passive territory’, which may require careful
monitoring or special planning to protect it from
disaster. In previous research (November, 2002, 2004,
2008), we have shown that the spatial dimension of
risk is in fact more complex than a Cartesian metric,
and that other types of relationship to territory exist.
In this article we explore this idea further, considering
risks and territory in an attempt to understand the
‘spatiality of risks’: how risk emerges and the
relationships between risks and affected areas.
Besides the material and physical dimensions of risk,
we consider their social, political, and economic
dimensions, which result in ever-changing
vulnerabilities, imbalances and delicate rebalancing
acts. First, however, we must consider the methods
used to represent, identify, classify and formulate
risks, particularly in view of the number of
stakeholders, with varying fields of expertise, who are
involved in such processes (Gilbert, 2007). This
approach requires us to leave the definition of risk
open-ended, at least to begin with.
We use data from a 2004 project, The Vulnerability of
Urban Infrastructures and Crisis Management: Impacts
and lessons learned from flood events in Switzerland,
within the framework of a European Union COST
project, Action C19 (November and Reynard, 2006;
Reynard and November, 2008). On the basis of three
case studies, one of which was flooding in the village
of Lully in November 2002, we identify and theorise
the impact of a local disaster (critical event) on local
development processes and collective knowledge of
risk. The research was conducted using documents
(archives, inquiry reports, development plans, hazard
studies, etc.) and 40 interviews with various
stakeholders involved in or affected by the crisis:
flooded residents, farmers, planning officials, water
management officials, and the emergency services.
We will describe what one interviewee called ‘the Lully
Effect’, an illustration of how a critical event can
refocus attention on known but partially forgotten
hazards, encouraging people to think about why such
risks had been forgotten in the first place, and helping
to foster a more concerted effort to manage flood risk
in the future.
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A memory for water or the
(un)expected emergence of
flood risk
The village of Lully lies in the Bernex district of the
Canton of Geneva, in western Switzerland. The area
affected by the flooding – Lower Lully (Bas-Lully) – is
one of the most recent extensions to the village. Lully
expanded gradually during the twentieth century,
initially above the floodplain, then in the 1960s into
the area at the foot of the hill. Known as Lower Lully,
the area lies close to the River Aire, the banks of
which are above the average ground level of the area.
The events and how the crisis was
managed
The village of Lully is exposed to three sources of
flood risk: rapid rises in the level of the River Aire; a
high piezometric level of the surface aquifer; and run-
off water from agricultural land further up the hillside.
In addition, there are several aggravating
circumstances: Lower Lully constitutes a small basin,
in which run-off water collects without any natural
drainage into the river; houses were built with
inhabitable basements (in spite of not being permitted
by local building regulations); and numerous
alterations had seriously diminished the capacity of a
collecting drain. Following heavy rainfall in the morning
of 15 November 2002, the Lower Lully basin was
flooded by a build-up of run-off water, as the main drain
was blocked by a sharp rise in the level of the River
Aire. In fact, the potential dangers had been revealed
in March 2001 by a smaller flood that had occurred for
exactly the same reasons. Ultimately, the damage was
only of a material nature (flooded houses and
apartment buildings, leading to evacuations and re-
housing of families), but the outcome could have been
far more tragic, given that some residents slept in the
basement, and were woken up only by the water
flooding in.
Local firemen had already been called out during the
day on 14 November to bail out a flooded underground
car park. Having been called out again at around 3am,
they were already at the scene when a further rise in
water level caused the ditches1 around the basements
of the newest houses to burst. Even though the area
was under water at that stage, the emergency services
did not think it necessary to order a complete
evacuation because they were unaware that the house
basements were inhabited. Consequently, the safety of
residents was put at risk, due to the misapprehension
that building regulations in the affected housing would
have been followed2. While the developers had
marketed and sold the basements of the worst-
affected housing as living space, planning permission
had been granted without the breach in building
regulations being detected. Furthermore, a previous
opportunity to identify this risk – when excavations for
the planned housing had been flooded in 2001 – had
also been missed.
Figure 1: Map of Lully
showing the area affected
by the flood event of 15
November 2002.
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The Aire Plain: Land improvements
and flood prevention over the
twentieth century
Changes in flood policy have progressively changed
the configuration of the Lully area in ways quite similar
to those described by C.L. Johnson and colleagues for
England and Wales (Johnson et al., 2005). Historically,
flood risk in Lully was well-established. Place-names
indicate areas of marshland, and people with long-term
associations with the area (such as market gardeners
and a few local residents) could testify to what had
been a major feature of its development from as far
back as the late nineteenth century. Efforts to combat
flooding and improve poor drainage in the area
officially began with the first alteration of the river in
1890 and the first Cantonal Drainage Law (Loi
cantonale sur le drainage) in 1907.3
In an attempt to prevent sharp rises in its water level
causing flooding, in 1890 the course of the river Aire
was altered where the danger was greatest, between
the French border (for administrative reasons) and the
village of Lully. In the 1920s the Canton of Geneva
began subsidised drainage campaigns and regrouping
of land holdings with a view to optimising agricultural
production. 400km of canals and land drains were
constructed, and a total of 630 hectares, including 98
in the Lully plain, were successfully turned into
agricultural land. However, the standardised size of the
drains was inadequate in areas of high flood risk, and
local dissatisfaction with the arrangement was
exacerbated when recurring floods caused high levels
in the river and prevented the water from draining
away. The same problem would occur during the 2002
floods.
As land improvement works continued, the course of
the River Aire was altered for a second time. The aim
on this occasion was to ensure an outlet for drainage
water by lowering the riverbed, especially in Lully. The
work was completed in 1933, but failed to resolve the
flood problem. The channelling of the Aire increased
the speed of upstream run off, leading to sharper rises
in water levels downstream. A third and final alteration
became necessary downriver, and this was completed
in 1940.
Planning permission for a large housing development
in 1954 marked the beginning of the urbanisation of
Lower Lully. Although the third river alteration was
deemed to have solved the drainage problem once and
for all, sharp rises in water levels led to two further
floods, in 1976 and 1979, when part of the new
development had already been built. That led in 1980
to the construction of a drainage gallery downriver
from the village, designed to transfer excess water into
the River Rhône. In 1979, local residents obtained an
injunction from the Geneva Administrative Tribunal to
prevent new houses from being built, on the grounds
that freshwater drainage systems were inadequate. As
a result, an expert report was drawn up, which
recommended enhancing the capacity of several
collecting drains. The most recent floods in Lower
Lully, both caused by excess run-off water, occurred in
1983 and 2001.
Thus, even though flooding had been an integral part
of the recent history of the Aire plain, its threat had
been partially forgotten, partly as a result of planning
permission for new housing in 1954 and, more
importantly, on account of the new drainage gallery
built in the 1980s. The high water levels of 1976 and
1979, the decision of the Administrative Tribunal, and
the flooding in 1983, revived the issue of high water
levels and inadequate drainage. However, on each
occasion, the response was to carry out ad-hoc repair
work designed to facilitate the area’s further
development.
Flood protection measures: a
means of assimilating – and
concealing – risk?
Attempts were made to resolve the issue of flooding
whenever the vulnerability of the area came to the
fore. In that sense, the risk was never exactly ignored,
but, with hindsight, we now know that successive
alterations to the watercourse led to other unforeseen
risks (e.g. reduction of the flood basin, channelling
heavy flow downstream).
Nevertheless, the memory of the risk and all its
various components seems to have been lost due to
the adoption of successive protection measures.5 The
two main sources of flooding were addressed first
jointly (the second river correction was largely
designed to improve the drainage of run-off water, the
volume of which entering the river had increased
sharply following the drainage of the plain), and then
separately (the drainage gallery and increase in the
capacity of collecting drains). These protection
measures seem to have allayed the fear of flooding
and engendered a sense of security. Nothing now
seemed to stand in the way of developing an area
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nonetheless liable to flooding. Was this the beginning
of the process of risk memory loss?
Retaining the memory of risk is a complex matter. For
instance, expert knowledge is built up gradually over
the course of a whole career, and the transmission
and sustainability of such knowledge has always been
a challenge (Boutte, 2007). In this case, the
knowledge holders are individuals (experts and others)
and archives. Long periods of stable water levels,
coupled with the adoption of technical protection
measures, contribute to risk memory loss. Prior to the
critical event in Lully, the local planning authorities no
longer sought to access the relevant knowledge. While
evidence of the risk could easily have been found,
local authority departments were partially unaware of
it, allowing for breaches in building regulations to take
place, sometimes deliberately (to increase real estate
values in the area), and sometimes through negligence
(planning permission granted without due regard for
the potential dangers).
While long-term residents were still aware of the risk, if
only through having experienced several floods first-
hand and thus prepared themselves for others, the
same could not be said of new residents, many of
whom had arrived on account of changes in land
allocation, and were preceded by promoters
determined to seek a maximum return on real estate
value (inhabitable basements). In an area where
natural hazards had never generally been very
threatening, the new arrivals came in search of a
better quality of life, in a suburban district with a
mixture of small farms and recently-built homes. The
‘village home’ became synonymous with security, and
the city was perceived as more dangerous even though
it had never been associated with natural hazards
either. Thus, new residents were easily convinced by
the promoters, the architects, and indeed the
authorities, who described the basement flooding of
the partially built houses in 2001 as a one-off event.6
How floods draw attention
to risk and help to recover
lost memory
Taking risk to mean ‘a well-identified hazard,
associated with the occurrence of a clearly describable
event or series of events, which we do not know will
happen but we know is likely to happen’7, all risks
have a dual identity: on the one hand, they are
potential occurrences, or distant expectations
(Koselleck, 1985), yet on the other hand, reference is
made to past disasters to define and describe current
risks. Disasters have a real impact, which means they
can be used for calculations and measurements, or
turned into ‘likely scenarios’.8 The past informs each
situation in terms of its own risks, through a carefully
calculated transformation of knowledge of past
disasters.
The relationship between disaster
and risk – is it really so obvious?
In the case of the flooding in Lully, previous events –
except for the 2001 flood – occurred in such a way as
to make it difficult to predict accurately what was to
come, or for local people to retain the memory of risk.
While there had been previous instances of flooding,
they had come at a time when the land was essentially
agricultural. Subsequent changes in land use had
helped to create new manifestations of flood risk by
transforming the behaviour of variables and giving rise
to new vulnerabilities (such as increasingly
impermeable ground cover and progressive
densification of flood-prone areas as safer areas
become scarce). Moreover, the flooding in 2002
resulted not from a rise in the level of the Aire, as
many interpreted it, but from the impact of surface run-
off that few had anticipated. In fact, although earlier
events had occasionally had dramatic consequences,
they had never been sufficiently serious (in terms of
their scope and social reaction) to make a lasting
impression on people. That is why we must look
beyond the rationalist model described above and
consider practical rather than pre-established means
of enabling stakeholders to understand and manage
risk more effectively. By focusing on the work of all
those engaged in making risks readable in an attempt
to face up to their threat, we will use this approach to
describe the flooding in Lully as the outcome of a
misreading of risk.
All risks are the outcomes of a process of individual
and collective efforts to identify the phenomenon and
its likely consequences. In other words, the
descriptiveness of the risk, or the extent to which the
negative consequences of its potential emergence can
be described, either on the basis of predictions or
experience (rainfall threshold, occupied basement
rooms, area liable to flooding, etc.), is central to the
risk identification process. A risk needs to have been
recognised, or ‘read’, by the relevant stakeholders,
before it can be described; the mere availability of
information is no guarantee that it will be noticed by
the people concerned. For instance, a master plan for
the district of Lully (the Ortis Plan), published in 1982,
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contained information concerning the areas liable to
flooding, and yet new housing estates would still be
built in precisely those areas, with no further reference
being made to the flood risk in subsequent planning
documents. Evidence of the threat did reappear on
hazard maps published in 2000, but local planning
officials failed to take it into account. As a result, the
flooding ended up catching everyone, including officials
at Geneva’s water management authorities, unawares.
The vagueness of the category ‘run-off water’,
identified as a risk – or, at the very least, a nuisance –
during the nineteenth-century land improvement
campaigns (leading to the drainage of marshland), and
the fact that it was less explicitly identified in the Ortis
Plan (where areas are simply identified as liable to
flooding, without mentioning the source of the risk as
either rising water levels or run-off), prevented the risk
from being correctly interpreted.
Critical event and focusing event
The notion of a hold may be helpful in understanding
how this situation came about. According to French
sociologists Bessy and Chateauraynaud, holds emerge
from the interaction between bodies and strategies,
‘like a climber’s holds emerging from a series of
confrontations between the mountaineer and the rock
face. Holds can describe the relationship between
people and objects in two ways: as having a hold on
something, an expression often used to describe
humans (active, interactive and inquiring) gaining the
upper hand over objects and their environment (inert,
passive and subject to human endeavour); or as
suggesting the irreducible nature of objects and the
difficulty of even getting a hold’ (1995, p. 239). The
holds selected are never a foregone conclusion, but
‘the outcome of a meeting between a strategy,
pursued by the relevant stakeholder(s), and a network
of bodies, characterized by their peaks, folds and
cracks’ (1995, p. 239). In a risky environment, where
various disaster prevention strategies could be
employed, measures are in practice adopted on the
basis of a selection process, or an assessment of
relevant factors. In this context, the events in Lully in
2002 can be seen as the outcome of a misreading of
risk by the relevant stakeholders, forcing them to make
an emergency reassessment with scant regard for
established procedures.9
The events of 2002 were therefore a necessary
precondition for what has been described as the ‘Lully
Effect’: a reopening of channels of communication
between stakeholders with a view to drawing up a
common prevention strategy. In spite of its relatively
small scale, the flooding was an example of the type
of focusing event described by Birkland (1998). For
instance, it was the driving force behind a restructuring
of local government departments, including the
creation of a new post specifically to scrutinise
planning applications in order to assess the likelihood
of associated flood risks. Rather than simply looking
at the distance of the proposed building from the river
(in the past, applications were only forwarded to the
rivers department if the proposed building was less
than 100m from the river), the occupant of the new
post would carry out a comprehensive flood-risk
assessment of all planning applications, taking into
account all relevant factors, such as ground water, run-
off water, rivers and streams. The district authorities
also set up a flood warning system, consisting of a
telephone hotline with three levels of alert. A local
residents’ association was formed and has since
become an essential partner for the local authorities.
Residents bought flood guards for their windows and
made arrangements for getting into each other’s
homes in the event of a repeat of the flooding. In other
words, a whole hazard protection system was set up,
involving both objects (streams, telephones, maps, to
name but a few) and people (local residents, officials,
etc.).10 Fire officers, weather forecasters and other
professionals also provided valuable feedback, leading
to a lowering of the emergency rainfall threshold for
Lully and the creation of a special flood prevention unit
to be activated in the event of heavy rainfall (the
CIGE).
The 2002 flooding also helped to speed up completion
of a number of projects already under way. Work on the
collecting drain was soon completed, work on the
revitalisation of the river Aire was carried out with
renewed energy, and significant resources were
allocated to the protection of local residents. Indeed,
the revitalisation project was widened in scope to give
equal weight to flood-risk protection, and special
priority was granted to the Lower Lully section of the
river, to the dismay of market gardeners in other areas
who had been seeking land improvements. Thus, a
collective rethink took place in the aftermath of the
flooding, enabling people to see problems in a new
light and to suggest innovative solutions.
Multiple sources of knowledge
The Lully case demonstrates how the perception of
risk evolved during the response to a critical event,
and also highlights the existence of multiple sources
of knowledge of risk before the event took place.
Various pockets of knowledge co-existed without ever
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coming together, underlining the need for enhanced
communication of the various (and by no means
exclusive) approaches to risk identification and
assessment. 
Some stakeholders, on account of their training, use
highly specialised vocabulary to provide a scientific
analysis of the event. Others, such as local residents
or market gardeners, do not possess such specialist
knowledge or expertise, and so rely more on their
powers of observation. And yet, interviewees
consistently referred to the same issues, irrespective
of their social or professional background or training.
All of those affected, from the local residents whose
houses were flooded, to senior planning officials,
referred to the collecting drain, the drainage
campaigns, the river alterations, the saturated soil, the
run-off water, the flood basin, the age-old problem of
rising water levels and the Geneva information system
(SITG – système d’information du territoire genevois),
etc. This reinforces the idea that knowledge of risk
comes from multiple sources. According to Le Bourhis,
this can be attributed to sociological and
organisational changes – such as enhanced public
access to information, particularly via the internet –
and administrative reforms that led to cartography
rationalisation (systematic collection, standardisation,
storage and publication of the territorial data) (2007).
These distinct but convergent sources of knowledge of
risk had never come into contact with each other
before the 2002 flooding. The information held by
different stakeholders had never been properly shared
in spite of numerous (lost) opportunities. Thus the
2001 flooding, which had less serious consequences
but where the new houses under construction served
as collecting basins, failed to serve as a warning of
the likelihood of further flooding in the area. Plans
were made to install a new collecting drain, but the
work was only carried out after the second, more
serious, flood. Hazard maps were available, but the
Geneva authorities failed to ensure that development
plans took them into account. Market gardeners knew
that the area was liable to flooding, but their warnings
about poor water management were never taken
seriously enough. One individual told us: ‘We know the
area, and we knew that flooding was always a
possibility, but is it really up to us to warn people
about it?’ In fact, market gardeners could have warned
people of the dangers, in view of their local knowledge,
but tended to be accused of ‘doom-mongering’ if they
did so, on account of their lack of authority or status
(Chateauraynaud and Torny, 1999, p. 10). This
provides further evidence of a breakdown in
communication,11 with the result that different risk
assessment approaches developed in isolation from
one another.
Dwelling in territory at risk
Clearly, flooding constitutes a highly traumatic
experience for some, and events of this kind also act
as necessary reminders of the need for concerted
social and political action (described here as the ‘Lully
Effect’). Risks tend to be gradually forgotten or
neglected, until a critical event, identified in retrospect
by researchers, helps to trigger a collective
remembrance12 of risks and their impact. The often
heated discussion that results from the shared
experience of flooding helps to create a sense of
common responsibility for dealing with risk in local
communities. In other words, flooding seems to help
develop (in the photographic sense) old and neglected
knowledge, by marking with the graphic image of
flooded territory both the minds of individuals
(individual dimension) and the common perceptions
and representations of risk associated with the event
(collective dimension). As a result of this process,
triggered by the critical event, a collective experience
is committed to memory, both in the minds of
individuals and in the relevant political, technical and
administrative bodies. We can see how subsequent
perceptions of risk are formed by observing how risks
are ‘translated’, through a process of ‘argumentation,
profit sharing, advocacy and alliance building’ (Vinck,
2003) ‘leading to the gradual formation and
emergence of a social and natural world’ (Callon,
1986).
Experience of disaster and social
inquiry
We can therefore see the social experience of the Lully
flooding in a different light. The end result was to rid
the local community of its perception of risk as no
more than an external threat to the village’s safety. It
also went some way to banishing the myth that risk
could be identified and assessed with pinpoint
accuracy, as an object of scientific and technical study.
The multiplicity of approaches to risk assessment
(scientific, technical and popular) and the unsuitability
of preventive measures to cope with unpredictable
weather conditions indicate the limits of that
conception. Flooding ‘is a stimulus to action’ (Latour,
1991); it forces residents, authorities, and indeed all
the relevant stakeholders, to leave old habits behind
and to deal with issues in the light of experience, in
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the sense of the ‘perception and reception of a
physical reality’ (Ogien and Quéré, 2005). In other
words, experience here describes a transformational
journey; an ordeal that opens up new possibilities for
understanding and interpretation. Referring to Dewey’s
pragmatist philosophy, which identifies experience as
the organising principle of an ever-changing system,
Ogien and Quéré state that ‘the system has inner
tensions, sources of resistance, incompatibilities and
contradictions, all of which lead to imbalances, but it
also has the potential to deploy structuring elements’
(p. 38). In their view, experience creates an artificial
sense of order in an effort to reduce the inevitable
complexity of real situations, to overcome sources of
tension, incompatibility or conflict arising from the
interaction between bodies and their environment, and
to restore a necessary balance. In the light of this
approach, we suggest that, in the case of the flooding
in Lully, bodies and the environment should not be
seen as independent entities at all, but as two
elements of the same process.
Indeed, experience implies ‘an active encounter with
things’, where the body tries out ‘its powers of action
on the world around it’. This leads to changes in the
surrounding environment which in turn affect bodies
and alter the conditions of their existence (Dewey,
1939). From this perspective, experience means the
‘controlled or managed transformation of an
indeterminate situation into a situation so determined
by its constituent characteristics and relationships
that it converts the elements of its original situation
into a unified whole’. It is also a method of ‘social
inquiry’ (another of Dewey’s key concepts) which is
seen as an ongoing activity common to all participants
and aims to adapt society to a given situation by
removing its sources of confusion or conflict, in order
to facilitate the choice of a particular course of action.
The concepts developed by Dewey can be used to
understand the reflexive activity (which may not be
either planned or co-ordinated) driving the relevant
stakeholders in the aftermath of the disaster. Once the
flooding had destroyed the sense of stability
associated with living in Lully, people had to make new
arrangements, incorporating the environment as the
subject of agency.
Residents begin to share with their
environment
There can be no doubt that, for the inhabitants of Lully,
the experience of the 2002 flooding constituted a
challenge to their previous way of life. Their whole
relationship to space was called into question. For
example, recent arrivals in Lower Lully, who had
thought they were moving to a quiet, peaceful area
(compared to the urban environment they had left
behind), realised that their new environment was
neither neutral nor passive, but had its own history,
physical and geological characteristics, reactions to
changing weather conditions, etc. Dwelling, understood
as a given (or the occupation of a passive territory),
suddenly became an ongoing practice of building a
dynamic relationship to space. 13 In this sense, the
flooding helped to make residents realise the complex
relationship between dwelling and its constituent
territory. At the same time, their experience of a
critical event led to the development of new practices
aimed at adapting modes of dwelling to an
environment now perceived as a risky one.
Consequently, one could argue that the critical flood
event should be seen as the subject of agency (in the
sense of an object with the capacity to influence the
outcome of an action), playing a role equal to that of
human activity – in shaping territory. Like Bruno Latour,
who argues that ‘it isn’t so much the sudden
emergence of environmental issues on the political
agenda that we are witnessing, but the multiplication
of tangled objects, which can no longer be confined to
the natural world or naturalized by anyone’ (Latour,
2004), we maintain, on the basis of the Lully case,
that natural phenomena cannot be confined to their
natural dimension, but should be considered as active
subjects in their relationships with other bodies living
in the same territory. Therefore it is important to
understand how the interaction between humans and
non-humans generates new situations, irreducible to
the rearrangement or recombination of materials that
existed prior to that interaction. Restricting risk
analysis to the two dominant (functional and
probabilist) approaches fails to allow for a
comprehensive view of the relationship between risk
and territory. Based on the lessons drawn from this
research, we intend to adopt a new approach to the
risk–territory relationship. We will assert that, in order
to take into account the multiplicity of approaches, as
well as the complex spatial dimensions of risk,
analysis should focus on the connexity14, rather than
proximity (or close relatedness) of activities. This will
reveal the multiple, and not only metric, proximities
involved, resulting from discursive as well as
geographic spaces.
Conclusion
Thus, the Lully case study opens up further research
opportunities into risk assessment and crisis
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management, focusing on how knowledge is acquired,
consolidated, revised or abandoned as communities
are exposed to risk, either before or after a critical
event. In particular, it would be interesting to consider
how knowledge is acquired by risk professionals (such
as fire officers, forecasters, etc.) and regulators (such
as planners and lawyers), in view of its numerous
material and spatial consequences for local
development. The empirical study of the Lully floods
demonstrated the complex nature of the relationship
between risk and territory, and revealed many of the
spatial consequences of that relationship. First, it
showed that the notion of ‘passive territory’ cannot be
used to explore the spatial dimension of risk, and that
such a truncated view fails to reflect a detailed
understanding of the local development processes
caused by situations of risk.15 Second, it showed that
the logic of seeing disasters as the ‘natural’ extension
of risks has its limits. A disaster-based analysis tends
to assume that the consequences can only be
measured in terms of the scope of their impact.
However, the flooding in Lully was more of a focusing
event, that is to say an event which led to a shake-up
of knowledge and practice and, at the same time,
became an agent in the process of change. This
accounts for our choice of the expression critical event
to describe the situation more accurately.
Ultimately, the main aim of this study was to show how
risks and their actual manifestations as crises help to
change the territories in which they occur. Therefore
highlighting the various forms of knowledge involved in
defining the spatiality of risk is of crucial importance:
only then can the performative dimension of the risk–
territory relationship be explored, revealing its capacity
to alter the tangible and intangible dimensions of
space. Our key theoretical and practical aims, backed
up by this study of the ‘Lully Effect’, are to deepen our
understanding of the local development processes
triggered by exposure to risk, and to help to combine
expert and other forms of knowledge to provide
effective social and political responses to the growing
number of risks that occur in contemporary societies.
Notes
1. Channels dug around the external outside the building
walls to allow sunlight into the basements.
2. Legal action has been taken against the local and regional
authorities as well as the architects and developers, on
charges of endangering the lives of residents.
3. Pursuant to the Federal Law on the Improvement of
Agriculture in the Confederation (Loi fédérale concernant
l’amélioration de l’agriculture par la Confédération),
adopted in 1893.
4. The Canton of Geneva is one of the 26 constituent States
of the Swiss Confederation (Confédération helvétique).
5. If one issue seems to have been neglected in the literature
on risk, it is the question of memory. We would argue that
memory of risk results from individual and collective
events and, at the same time, generates individual and
collective practices. Through this two-way process, it
leaves its trace – or its mark – on territory. For a more in-
depth exploration of this idea, see Leborgne’s original
approach (2006) concerning forgetfulness and the role of
collective memory in the sense of belonging to a
particular territory.
6. Trust in this sense is very important and is built up through
various processes at different stages of risk issues (see
for instance O’Riordan and Ward, 1997; Parker et al.,
2007).
7. ‘[…] danger bien identifié, associé à l’occurrence d’un
événement ou d’une série d’événements, parfaitement
descriptibles, dont on ne sait pas s’ils se produiront mais
dont on sait qu’ils sont susceptibles de se produire’,
according to the definition proposed by Callon, Lascoumes
and Barthe (2001, p. 37).
8. For more on these processes, see, inter alia: Callens,
1997; Desrosières, 1998; Hacking, 1975.
9. As Ost says, ‘emergencies, which generate urgent and
pressing needs, create exceptional circumstances, where
the seriousness of the situation calls for immediate
action, partially ignoring or even totally disregarding usual
procedures if necessary’ (1999, pp. 276-7).
10. And the community showed genuine co-operation and
commitment to that system (see Latour, 2005).
11. The Tanquerel Report (2003), commissioned to
investigate possible administrative failures, points to
overlapping areas of ‘negative competence’.
12. For more on collective remembrance processes, see
Halbwachs, 1992; Ricoeur, 2004; Leborgne, 2006.
13. Our understanding of the term ‘dwelling’ is with reference
to Lévy and Lussault (2003, p. 442), for whom ‘this very
general and inevitably multi-dimensional term (dwelling
can refer to many different actions, processes and
objects) is an accurate reflection of the multi-faceted
nature of relationships to space. The term also suggests
the opening up of the relationship between dwelling and
dweller: one cannot dwell in an inhabitable dwelling, but
dwelling may alter spaces significantly’ (translated by the
authors).
14. ‘Connexity’ is a concept used to evoke the multiplicity of
relationships between places, points and networks (see
Lévy, 1994; Offner, in Lévy and Lussault, 2003, pp. 198-
9). ‘Connexity’ makes it possible to conceptualise and
understand the heterogeneous nature of ‘territoriality’.
This notion has been applied to risks only recently
(November, 2004).
15. This challenge has been taken up by the ‘Risk Print’
research project, launched at EPFL in October 2006 by the
ESpRi Group (Study Group on the Spatiality of Risks),
financed by the Swiss National Science Foundation.
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